解析“科斯定理”

科斯定理是寻求外部性问题内在化的一种途径与方法,它以市场经济为前提,借助交易费用这一中间媒介,通过产权制度安排这一根本办法来解决外部性问题。尽管科斯定理有其自身局限性,但在客观上推动了外部性的深入探讨,为外部性理论的发展作出了重要贡献。     

PRICING AND HEDGING DOUBLE-BARRIER OPTIONS: A PROBABILISTIC APPROACH

Barrier options have become increasingly popular over the last few years. Less expensive than standard options, they may provide the appropriate hedge in a number of risk management strategies. In the case of a single-barrier option, the valuation problem is not very difficult (see Merton 1973 and Goldman, Sosin, and Gatto 1979). the situation where the option gets knocked out when the underlying instrument hits either of two well-defined boundaries is less straightforward. Kunitomo and Ikeda (1992) provide a pricing formula expressed as the sum of an infinite series whose convergence is studied through numerical procedures and suggested to be rapid. We follow a methodology which proved quite successful in the case of Asian options (see Geman and Yor 1992,1993) and which has its roots in some fundamental properties of Brownian motion. This methodology permits the derivation of a simple expression of the Laplace transform of the double-barrir price with respect to its maturity date. the inversion of the Laplace transform using techniques developed by Geman and Eydeland (1995), is then fairly easy to perform.     

Moral Agency,Profits and the Firm: Economic Revisions to the Friedman Theorem

The paper reconstructs in economic terms Friedman’s theorem that the only social responsibility of firms is to increase their profits while staying within legal and ethical rules. A model of three levels of moral conduct is attributed to the firm: (1) self-interested engagement in the market process itself, which reflects according to classical and neoclassical economics an ethical ideal; (2) the obeying of the “rules of the game,” largely legal ones; and (3) the creation of ethical capital, which allows moral conduct to enter the market process beyond the rules of the game. Points (1) and (2) position the Friedman theorem in economic terms while point (3) develops an economic revision of the theorem, which was not seen by Friedman. Implications are spelled out for an instrumental stakeholder theory of the firm. Dr. Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto is researcher in business ethics at the School of Management of the University of Leicester, UK. He holds two doctorates, one in social studies from the University of Oxford, UK, and one in economic studies from the Catholic University of Eichstaett, Germany. He has widely published on green consumerism and institutional economic issues that concern organization theory and business ethics theory. His publications include the books Understanding Green Consumer Behaviour (Routledge, 1997 & 2003) and Human Nature and Organization Theory (Edward Elgar, 2003).     

Unanimity,anonymity, and infinite population

This paper is concerned with the implications of unanimity and anonymity for the Arrovian social choice theory when population is infinite. Contrary to the finite population case, various unanimity and anonymity axioms can be formulated. We show a tension between unanimity and anonymity by providing possibility and impossibility results. We also examine the case in which social preferences are allowed to be quasi-transitive.     

NO‐ARBITRAGE IN A NUMÉRAIRE‐INDEPENDENT MODELING FRAMEWORK

The classic approach to modeling financial markets consists of four steps. First, one fixes a currency unit. Second, one describes in that unit the evolution of financial assets by a stochastic process. Third, one chooses in that unit a numéraire, usually the price process of a positive asset. Fourth, one divides the original price process by the numéraire and considers the class of admissible strategies for trading. This approach has one fundamental drawback: Almost all concepts, definitions, and results, including no‐arbitrage conditions like NA, NFLVR, and NUPBR depend by their very definition, at least formally, on initial choices of a currency unit and a numéraire. In this paper, we develop a new framework for modeling financial markets, which is not based on ex‐ante choices of a currency unit and a numéraire. In particular, we introduce a “numéraire‐independent” notion of no‐arbitrage and derive its dual characterization. This yields a numéraire‐independent version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing (FTAP). We also explain how the classic approach and other recent approaches to modeling financial markets and studying no‐arbitrage can be embedded in our framework.     

L-模糊赋范空间中的不动点定理

通过给出L-模糊赋范空间中点列收敛的概念,本文建立L-模糊赋范空间中的不动点定理,推广了泛函分析中的不动点定理。     

法经济学视角下的环境规制问题研究

环境规制是一个已经讨论了很长时间的问题,其主要规制手段——行政手段和市场手段早已为人们所熟知。近年来,相对于坚持两种规制手段均为主的美、日、德等环境规制效果较好的国家,我国越来越倾重于以市场手段为主来进行环境规制,但规制效果相对以上国家却仍然存在较大差距。找到环境规制效果差别巨大的原因对于构建和谐社会,促进人与自然协调发展具有极为重要的关键性作用。以法经济学作为切入点来考察坚持两种环境规制手段均为主的原因以及这样做的意义和影响,从而指出我国环境规制政策中的不足和效果不佳的原因,并为我国进一步完善环境规制政策和改善环境规制效果提出意见建议。     

阿罗不可能定理假设条件的混沌学解读

公理性假设条件是解决阿罗悖论的突破口,本文以混沌学的视角来对其进行解读。通过文献梳理,三个特点说明混沌学可以用来研究社会选择过程。通过对社会选择过程的系统动力学建模与分析,证明在阿罗不可能定理的假设下,社会选择动力学系统存在混沌。进而发现,对阿罗不可能定理的假设条件,经济学家所提出的放松约束的路径与用混沌学解析得出的结论具有一致性,得到三方面启示：①在简单的假设条件下,社会选择过程依然表现出一定的复杂性。②社会选择过程存在混沌是阿罗不可能定理的一种表现形式。③混沌学可能是寻求阿罗不可能定理成立的本质原因的另一条路径。     

A necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core

In 2004, Predtetchinski and Herings [A. Predtetchinski, P.J.J. Herings, “A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game”, Journal of Economic Theory 116 (2004) 84–92] provided a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game. In this paper, we extend this theorem to its counterpart in fuzzy games and give a necessary and sufficient condition for a non-transferable utility fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core. As a consequence, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the fuzzy core of a TU fuzzy game.